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Steptoe: Mr. Trumka: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It

MR. TRUMKA: IF IT AIN'T BROKE, DON'T FIX IT!
ROBERT M. STEPTOE, JR.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Distilled to its essence, Mr. Trumka's lecture at the West Virginia College of
Law had but one real thesis: recent decisions of the National Labor Relations
Board do not favor organized labor to the extent Mr. Trumka deems appropriate.
While purporting to explain a complete and irreversible failure of organic
federal labor law in the context of a "deindustrialized" America, Mr. Trumka's
address really is no more than a partisan adverse commentary upon the presently
constituted Board (the Board). Regrettably, I concur that our once highly industrialized society does indeed face a myriad of increasing and seemingly insoluble economic problems; but to make "labor law" the scapegoat for these
problems, as Mr. Trumka would do, is simply misleading. Rather, the "deindustrialization" problems our society faces are attributable to global economic,
and technological developments which substantive labor law will not alter.
Thus, I cannot accept Mr. Trumka's thesis that labor law has failed; nor can
I see any merit whatsoever in his suggestion that employees and society would
better fare if the National Labor Relations Act were abolished, the Board scrapped,
and "the struggle" transferred to the state courts. To me, at least, Mr. Trumka's
solution would set labor relations back half a century.

II.

FAILURE

OF THE COURTS TO IMPLEMENT A WORKABLE LABOR POLICY

In his haste to bury substantive federal labor law and shift "the struggle"
into the state courts, Mr. Trumka seems to have lost some sense of the history
and purpose of modern labor law. Slightly over fifty years ago, when organized
labor already had been part of the American working way of life for over a
century, the situation was chaotic. The courts-Mr. Trumka's suggested panacea-had not been able to formulate or implement a workable labor policy as
the increased activities of organized labor raised issues of national proportion.
Case-by-case adjudication on a state-by-state basis was simply an inadequate solution for the problem. No consistent, cohesive policies were developed; court
procedures were slow and cumbersome; judicial remedies were too inflexible to
implement effectively what few and diverse substantive standards were developed;
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and federal courts were not bound to follow state common law. The net result
was that the judiciary failed to achieve any workable balance of the power of
incorporated capital and the power of organized workers. Too often the courts
unnecessarily suppressed the activity of organized labor out of fear for disruption
of the interstate flow of goods, concern for expansion of labor disputes through
secondary boycotts, and a desire to protect both the consumers and the unorganized segment of the work force.
Mr. Trumka's suggestion that responsibility for formulating labor law should
be relegated back to the courts is, as he admits, at odds with the wisdom of the
past, for the historical judicial inability to define and enforce national labor policy
caused the executive and legislative branches of government to fill the void and
spawn modern American labor law. Recognizing both the important function that
organized labor played in the national economy and the absolute necessity for
industrial peace arising out of a balance of power between management and labor,
at the turn of the century the Congress began its attempts to protect organizing
employees by eliminating judicial interference with the operation of unions and
by affording some union operatives affirmative legal protection.'
Following early twentieth century legislative attempts to achieve uniform and
stable labor law, in 1935 Congress adopted what would become the bedrock of
2
modern American labor law-the Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act).
Senator Wagner's bill, designed to give federal support to employee organizing
and collective bargaining, was introduced in an optimum political environment.
Our country, still devastated by the Great Depression, was governed by a Democratic president and Congress. The New Deal climate favored federal legislation
to promote the growth of organized labor-growth believed necessary if employees
were to acquire sufficient economic leverage to bargain effectively with management. It was hoped that a more equitable division of the spoils of private enterprise would raise the spending power of working employees and thereby shorten
the depression.
The National Labor Relations Act put teeth into earlier federal labor laws,
which were little more than aspirational. Employees were not just granted the
right to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in strikes and other concerted
activity. More importantly, the NLRA created a mechanism for enforcement of
these previously ephemeral rights. Employer violations of employee rights became
actionable unfair labor practices within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National

I Early federal legislation included: Erdman Act, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898); Clayton Act, ch.
323, §§ 6, 20, 38 Stat. 731, 738 (1914); Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, §§ 11, 12, 14, 44 Stat. 587
(1926); Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932); the National Industrial Recovery Act, ch.
90, § 7, 48 Stat. 198 (1933).
2 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act or (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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Labor Relations Board-an agency of labor experts. Passage of the National
Labor Relations Act in 1935 was the watershed for organized labor to become
an important force in American industry. In the decade following, organized
employees increased in number from approximately three million to fifteen million.
Had federal labor law not evolved beyond the Wagner Act, Mr. Trumka
surely would not find it necessary to postulate the failure of labor law. But federal
labor law did evolve significantly in subsequent years, primarily because the 1935
Wagner Act was one-sided, protecting employees against employer tactics designed
to frustrate organizational activities, but providing management no corresponding
protection against union activities and, more importantly, providing employees
no protection against union actions and abuses.
Thus, at the conclusion of World War II, Congress turned its attention to
the need for modifications to the National Labor Relations Act. As a result of
perceived friction and division within the organized labor movement, increased
incidences of mass picketing and secondary boycotting, and various abuses in the
conduct of internal union affairs, the public began to feel that organized labor
was becoming irresponsible.3 In the words of one commentator, the U.S. labor
movement was the "largest, the most powerful, and the most aggressive that the
world has ever seen; and the strongest unions ...are the most powerful private
'4
economic organizations in the country."
When the eightieth Congress convened in 1947, the Republican party dominated Congress and the White House. It was clear that the one-sided Wagner
Act would be modified and, over President Truman's veto, the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act) became law. 5 With Taft-Hartley, Congress shifted the emphasis of federal labor law to a balanced statutory

Indeed, between 1936 and 1947, over 200 bills dealing with amendment of the Wagner Act
were introduced. In addition to public concerns articulated above, there were complaints that the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) unfairly combined the functions of investigation, prosecution,
and adjudication; that there existed inadequate court review of NLRB decisions; that the majority
rule concept of section 9(a) was ill advised; that the NLRB was incapable of determining appropriate
bargaining units; that the increased number of closed shop contracts was oppressive; that the Wagner
Act was excessively one-sided; and that there was increased need for government regulation of union
and concerted activity, union violence and corruption, and jurisdictional disputes, particularly in the
construction industry.
4 S. SLIcHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRiAL RE
ATIONS 154 (1947). Perhaps the most blatant
exercise of this union economic muscle occurred in 1943-a time when organized labor had pledged
no strikes until the end of the war. At that time, approximately 80% of the nation's coal miners
were working under UMWA contracts. Contrary to labor's pledge, the UMWA, under John L. Lewis,
conducted two long and crippling strikes which ended only when the United States Government had
made substantial concessions to the coal miners and their union. A. Cox & D. BocK, LABOR LAW
CAsas AND MATEmLAsS 130 (6th Ed. 1965).

Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 4 [1987], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW "EVIEW

[Vol. 89

scheme that not only protected employee rights to organize, bargain collectively,
and engage in concerted activity, but also restricted certain union conduct and
guaranteed certain freedoms of speech and conduct to employers and individual
employees. 6 It is noteworthy that organized labor made a grievous political error
which contributed in substantial part to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Overestimating its clout, organized labor opposed any change to the Wagner Act,
and by this intransigence eliminated any chance to have an effective voice. By
adopting the "all or nothing" approach, labor got essentially "nothing."
7
The last major statutory addition to federal labor law was adopted in 1959.
As a result of Senate investigation of corruption in several strong unions, there
was substantial legislative and public interest in achieving internal union democracy, which the Taft-Hartley Act had not effectively accomplished. Ironically,
organized labor again made grievous political errors. Perhaps buoyed in spirit by
the election of a Democratic Congress in 1958, organized labor fought hard for
Taft-Hartley amendments. Conversely, business opposed Taft-Hartley amendments unless some relief were afforded as to the effects of picketing and boycotts.
The inflexibility of labor leaders, who absolutely insisted upon significant TaftHartley changes as a condition to supporting any new labor legislation, resulted
in the adoption of the Landrum-Griffin Act, which afforded no Taft-Hartley relief
but, rather, embodied changes favorable to employees and business.'
In summary, the substantive body of federal labor law which Mr. Trumka
feels has outlived its usefulness consists of three major pieces of legislation adopted
between 1935 and 1959. First, the Wagner Act, a one-sided law, brought organized

6

Taft-Hartley engrafted broad new provisions upon the Wagner Act. Employees were given

the right to refrain from joining unions or engaging in section 7 protected activities. The size of the
NLRB was increased from three to five members, and the function of adjudication was separated

from the functions of investigation and prosecution. Six union unfair labor practices were created to
diminish secondary boycotts, prohibit coercion of employees, require good faith bargaining by unions,
and prohibit featherbedding. Section 8(c) was added to give employers and unions certain free speech

rights, and the duties of labor and management in collective bargaining were defined by a good faith
standard. Representation procedures were modified to give employees and employers some limited

rights, and minimal regulation of internal union affairs was required. Procedurally, Taft-Hartley made
it more difficult to overturn NLRB decisions in the courts, and the Board was given discretionary

authority to seek injunctions in federal courts pending the outcome of administrative litigation. Finally,
the states were authorized to adopt right to work laws having precedence over the section 8(a)(3)
union shop proviso.
I Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin Act) of 1959, ch. 120, tit. I,
61 Stat. 140.
9 The substance of Landrum-Griffin is basically as follows. Section 8(b)(7) was added to limit
recognitional or organizational picketing. Section 8(b)(4) tightened up secondary boycott loopholes in
Taft-Hartley. Section 8(e) created the hot cargo union unfair labor practice. Section 8(f) legitimized
pre-hire agreements in the construction industry. Voting rights were created for economic strikers for
a period of one year, and section 3(b) was amended to permit the NLRB to delegate to its regional
directors responsibility for determination of appropriate bargaining units and questions concerning
representation.
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labor to a level of unequaled economic power. Second,the Taft-Hartley Act, which
balanced the economic power somewhat, gave increased rights to employees and
employers. Third, the Landrum-Griffin Act basically continued the balance of
power achieved by Taft-Hartley. 9
III.

FEDERAL LABOR LAW isAuvE AND WELL

Simply stated, labor law has not failed and is in no immediate danger of
failing. The National Labor Relations Act affords employees, employers, and
labor organizations a delicate balance of rights and power. The system was not
hastily conceived, but rather has developed in stages over the past 50 years.
Mr. Trumka's argument that "labor law has become a dangerous farce" and
"has failed in its announced task of securing the rights of working persons" 10 is
belied by the fact that a Democratic Congress rejected union-backed labor law
reform proposals in 1977, even with President Carter's support for the legislation.
Were the situation as dismal as Mr. Trumka contends, surely the ninety-fifth
Congress would have enacted reforms necessary to preserve the balance of rights
and power achieved over the years."
Even though Mr. Trumka tells us labor law has lost all vitality, I suspect
that in reality he has no major quarrel with the body of substantive labor law.
Instead, his issue is with the Board, which he accuses of having transformed itself,
under President Reagan, into an active and conscious proponent of the destruction
of workers' rights and prosperity, all as the hand maiden of "the special interests." 2

9 An excellent history of the development of modem labor law is provided by the American
Bar Association Section of Labor and Employment Law. I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, 3-67 (C.
Morris 2d ed. 1983).
to Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 871, 877 (1987).
Putting aside for a moment my personal disagreement with Mr. Trumka's substantive thesis
that labor law has failed and should accordingly be buried, I wish to comment briefly upon Mr.
Trumka's choice of rhetoric, which to me seemed a bit extreme. No doubt he passionately and sincerely
feels for the working man, but many of his accusations and conclusions were unnecessarily overstated.
Before a sophisticated audience predominated by law professors, law students, and practicing members

of the bar, I wonder if Mr. Trumka's frequent use of hyperbole detracted from the substance of his
intended message.
2 Trumka, supra note 10, at 872. Curiously, Mr. Trumka thought it important to deny emphatically that labor is a "special interest." I would have thought that he, as president of the statutory
exclusive bargaining agent of thousands of coal miners, would view himself and his union as legally
obliged to have nothing less than the highest and most special interest in the welfare of his constituents.
In any event, it is doubtful that anyone takes seriously his assertion that "labor is not a special
interest," just as no one would credit a similar statement from the president of the National Association of Manufacturers.
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In fact, most labor lawyers acknowledge that the National Labor Relations
Board, despite periodic philosophical swings at the top,"3 is one of the most effective and efficient federal administrative agencies. Notwithstanding the fact that
Board members are political appointees, who obviously reflect in some part the
labor philosophy of the appointing President, the men and women who run the
Board's regional offices throughout the United States are highly competent public
servants who enforce the National Labor Relations Act with almost single-minded
dedication. Board members come and go, but Regional Directors, Regional Attorneys, Administrative Law Judges, and other major players tend to be life-long
fixtures within the agency. Board members undoubtedly have substantial influence
on many of the close and difficult issues,14 but with respect to protection of
employee rights to organize, engage in concerted activity, and bargain collectively,
Mr. Trumka is simply wrong in his assertion that labor law and the Board have
failed in the announced task of securing the fundamental rights of working persons.

In another time, with a different Board, I feel confident Mr. Trumka would
attack neither the law nor the Board. The pendulum will undoubtedly swing again,
and in a matter of years it will be business and industry castigating the Board
and Mr. Trumka providing its defense.
Mr. Trumka's thesis of labor law failure breaks down even further if one
thoughtfully defines the parameters of "labor law." Although Mr. Trumka confines his analysis to the National Labor Relations Act, generic labor law includes
a much broader collection of common law and statutory employee protections,
some of which Mr. Trumka and his union constituents rely upon with increasing
frequency. 5 These protections are afforded without regard to union membership
national work force trend away
or affiliation and may, ironically, explain the
6
from union representation and membership.'

,1 Bias within the NLRB is historical. It no more indicates labor law failure than judicial bias
indicates failure of the judicial system. It is axiomatic that personal bias will impact most legislative,
executive, and judicial decisions, and particularly in agency decisions will personal bias and expertise
tend to merge.

,4 The concerted activity issue emphasized by Mr. Trumka is difficult, and NLRB law on the
issue has been in a state of flux for some time.

,1Favorites include: Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982);
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982); Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title

VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2017 (1982); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 301-309 (1982); and Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-

1461 (1982). However, a review of the table of popular names acts in FederalLabor Laws, lists over
120 separate federal laws governing industrial activities, economic relations, employment opportunities,
and federal contracts. See FEDERAL

LABOR

LAws (8th ed. 1987). Add to these the various state leg-

islative and common law employee protections, and any reasonable person will easily conclude that
"labor law," in a generic sense, affords an amazingly broad array of employee protections.
," Contrary to Mr. Trumka's views, most modern employers conscientiously attempt to respect
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IV.

MR. TR UMKA

FEDERAL DEREGULATION

WOULD COMPOUND Tm

AMRIcAN

PROBLEM OF

"DEINDUSTRLALIZATION"
It is regrettable but true, as Mr. Trumka observes, that vast areas of America
are being deindustrialized and that capital investment by American employers is
increasingly shifting to other countries. But does Mr. Trumka's suggestion that
we "abolish the Act," "deregulate," and "let labor law cases go to the jury,"' 7
offer even a scintilla of hope that these problematical global economic developments will be reversed? Obviously not, and to imply that states' common law
of labor can restore America's industrial strength seems to be a red herring argument of the highest order. Absent stable and uniform labor law throughout
America, there Will be even less incentive for capital investment in this country.
History has taught us well that the judicial system is inherently incapable of
formulating and implementing effective labor law. Varying common law rules
developed in fifty different states by thousands of judges possessed of different
biases is not the answer. Most judges are experts in the study and application of
law generally but are rarely possessed with the economic sophistication and workplace expertise required to formulate and administer labor law. Under Mr. Trumka's
proposal, the free flow of interstate commerce would be severely hampered by
the emergence of conflicting state common law rules. Moreover, the courts are
not equipped to provide for and subsequently enforce effective labor remedies,
which frequently involve ongoing supervision of the parties.
V. CONCLUSION
Even if labor law had failed, it would be no solution to relegate the problem
to judges and juries. The obvious alternative available to Mr. Trumka and other
labor leaders is to go back to the source of our current body of labor law and
petition again for reform. If there is merit to what Mr. Trumka tells us, then
surely Congress will recognize that merit and act justly. Perhaps the administrative
scheme of things could be improved, and perhaps the range of philosophical swing
between succeeding Boards could be reduced. If so, I venture to say that business
would be as supportive as organized labor of reforms designed to make procedural
and substantive labor law more consistent and predictable.
In sum, I fear Mr. Trumka's brave new world "without preemption and the
expert agency."'" Current global economic conditions dictate conciliation, not
confrontation. Notwithstanding Mr. Trumka's aversion to the present Board and

employee rights. For Mr. Trumka to assert that labor law has totally failed the American worker is
grossly inaccurate. Perhaps what he really means to say is that labor law has failed to provide American

unions the desired level of economic power.
" Trumka, supra note 10, at 881.

" Id.
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its resolution of certain issues adverse to organized labor, the fact remains that
the overall body of labor law in our country is stable and balanced. The significant
employee rights secured by the Wagner Act are not in jeopardy. Employee jobs,
however, are in jeopardy, and it would be better for national labor leaders to
focus on the long term serious issue of work preservation rather than exacerbate
their short term quarrel with the Dotson Board. Myopic obsession with displeasing
Board decisions will get us nowhere. Instead, organized labor and business must
abandon the "we versus them" mentality and work toward achievement of mutually rewarding goals.
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